* QatarEnergy could control about a quarter of projected global LNG market
* Qatar has signed about 7 mtpa of long-term supply deals in and says more to come
* CEO Kaabi says the deals would generate trading revenue if Hormuz is closed again
* Qatar’s portfolio would be bigger than Shell’s but not better hedged, analysts say
By Marwa Rashad, Curtis Williams and Emily Chow
LONDON/HOUSTON/SINGAPORE, Nov 18 (Reuters) – QatarEnergy’s efforts to reduce its exposure to future disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz could leave it controlling roughly a quarter of global LNG supply within a decade, eclipsing rivals such as Shell, but raising concerns about market concentration and commercial risks.
The state energy company has signed long-term deals to buy LNG from US producer Cheniere Energy and from Woodside Energy’s US facilities, and is in further talks over additional supplies as it expands beyond its own production.
The deals took shape this summer, after the Iran war halted Hormuz shipments and forced QatarEnergy to declare force majeure.
If QatarEnergy meets its domestic expansion targets and secures additional US LNG supply, it could control 175 million to 185 million metric tons per annum by the early 2030s, according to Seb Kennedy, founder of LNG intelligence platform Energy Flux.
“That would be more than double Shell’s portfolio and roughly a quarter of the projected global market. On volume, it is in a league of its own,” Kennedy said.
Unlike Shell and TotalEnergies, whose LNG portfolios draw supply from more than 10 countries and are backed by extensive trading and optimisation operations, QatarEnergy’s future portfolio would remain concentrated largely in Qatar and the United States.
“Yes, it would be bigger than Shell, but not better hedged,” Kennedy said.
The strategy could also leave QatarEnergy balancing some of the world’s lowest-cost LNG from Qatar against more expensive US volumes secured under long-term commitments.
Unlike LNG produced from Qatari fields, LNG bought from US exporters often comes with liquefaction fees and costs linked to Henry Hub, the US benchmark for natural gas.
Kennedy estimates that a 30-mtpa US LNG portfolio would lock QatarEnergy into around $4 billion a year in liquefaction fees regardless of whether cargoes are lifted.
One Asian LNG buyer questioned how QatarEnergy would market its additional US volumes if the Middle East crisis is resolved and Hormuz shipments return to normal.
HEDGE AGAINST FUTURE HORMUZ CLOSURE
Qatar, one of the world’s largest LNG exporters, ships virtually all of its production through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically sensitive energy chokepoints.
An Iranian attack in March halted QatarEnergy shipments and forced the company to declare force majeure, Chief Executive Saad al-Kaabi told Reuters last month.
The deals with Cheniere and Woodside and the pursuit of additional supply deals act to hedge that exposure.
Kaabi described the hedge as financial rather than a physical backup.
In the event of another Hormuz closure, a spike in gas prices would let QatarEnergy’s trading arm and shipping fleet generate revenue from US-sourced LNG.
“This isn’t a completely new direction driven by the Hormuz closure… however, it’s been greatly accelerated by recent events,” said Alex Froley, senior LNG analyst at ICIS.
Kaabi set out plans in 2022 to make QatarEnergy the world’s largest LNG trader, and the company has spent years building overseas investments and trading operations. The war gave those assets a new purpose.
Before the war, Qatar exported about a fifth of globally traded LNG.
It is expanding domestic production capacity to 142 mtpa from 77 mtpa currently, while adding overseas volumes through the Golden Pass export project and long-term LNG purchase agreements.
Qatar’s greatest vulnerability had been supplying LNG from a single source, said Ira Joseph, senior fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
With US volumes, “they’re looking to provide a service essentially not from Qatar itself, but from their portfolio,” he said.
MARKET POWER OR MARKET CONCENTRATION?
Qatar’s strategy is blurring the line between rival sources of supply, analysts said.
For Asian buyers, the main risk is “growing dependence on a single supplier, even if the physical supply sources are diversified,” said Go Katayama, principal LNG analyst at Kpler.
“Buyers may benefit from greater supply security while becoming more dependent on a single counterparty.”
This could bolster QatarEnergy’s leverage in contract negotiations despite underlying supplies originating from different countries.
Columbia University’s Joseph said that with QatarEnergy acquiring US LNG on top of its domestic expansion, “the risk of market concentration, or certainly market influence, becomes much more significant.”
Shell, the world’s largest LNG trader, which sold around 73 million tons of LNG in 2025, and TotalEnergies, with 44 million tons, declined to comment on future competition from Qatar.
Analysts say Qatar is betting that keeping its market position after the war is worth the risk of holding more LNG than it can profitably market.
“The risk of ending up too long LNG is more than outweighed by the risk of losing its influential LNG market position and the dire economic and geopolitical consequences of that,” said Saul Kavonic, head of energy research at MST Marquee.
(Reporting by Marwa Rashad in London, Emily Chow in Singapore and Curtis Williams in Houston; Additional reporting by Dominique Patton in Paris; editing by Nina Chestney, Veronica Brown and Louise Heavens)