For U.S. President Donald Trump, Australia’s failed “Great Emu War” nearly a century ago offers a highly relevant lesson: technological superiority does not guarantee victory against a dispersed and resilient foe. At first glance, efforts to prevent flocks of large, flightless birds from devastating farmland seem to have little in common with the current conflict between the U.S. and Iran. Yet the parallel is clear. Both conflicts pit a powerful, technologically advanced military against a much weaker foe. And in both cases, the weaker party prevailed.
That obviously does not make Iran comparable to emus in any larger sense. The government in Tehran has used deadly force both at home and abroad while supporting a violent proxy network. Emus are large birds. But the lesson here is about strategy: superior firepower can fail against an adversary built to survive. It’s worth looking at why the Australian government went to war against the emus, and what it was trying to achieve, why it failed and how the conflict was ultimately resolved. In late 1932, about 20,000 emus migrated through the state of Western Australia and threatened wheat crops, prompting farmers to petition the government to control the birds. The proposed solution was to deploy machine guns and kill the birds, which can grow up to 1.8 metres (6 feet) tall. As an aside, emus appear alongside kangaroos on Australia’s coat of arms, making Australians among the few people who eat their national animals.
The fantastically named Major Gwynydd Purves Wynne-Aubrey Meredith of the Royal Australian Artillery was in command of the operation, and he initially used two Lewis machine guns to attack the emus. But when soldiers opened fire, the birds scattered into small flocks, leaving only small numbers dead. By one account, some 2,500 rounds of ammunition fired in the first week killed only 50 birds.
The lack of success meant the operation ended after only a month, and Meredith’s official report noted that his men had suffered no casualties, except for their dignity. But the emu problem persisted, prompting a second attempt. More birds were killed, but the result was the same: modern firearms couldn’t destroy a dispersed and mobile foe.
LIMITS OF POWER
The U.S. military is undisputed as the world’s top fighting force, boasting sophisticated weapons and delivery platforms. There is also little doubt that it can strike at will in Iran and inflict considerable damage on the Islamic Republic’s infrastructure and capabilities. But it has failed to deliver anything close to a knockout blow. Tehran clearly still possesses the ability to launch missiles and drones at the bases of the U.S. and its Gulf allies, as well as strike ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Despite its technological edge, the U.S. military appears incapable of preventing Iran from striking back. More critically, it has failed to keep open the vital waterway. As much as 20% of the world’s crude oil, refined products and liquefied natural gas, as well as significant volumes of aluminium and sulphur, passed through the Strait of Hormuz prior to the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran on February 28.
A 60-day ceasefire agreed in mid-June raised hopes that flows would be fully restored, but this broke down last week, and the U.S. and Iran resumed striking each other. It’s here that the lesson of the Emu War becomes clear. The first stage of the Iran conflict showed that military superiority can be countered by dispersing command and control, along with assets. The renewed U.S. attacks only underline the point. Iran retains the ability to hit back and threaten the global economy by choking energy supplies. Like the emus, Iran has only to survive to win while waiting for the costs to become too high for Trump and the global economy to bear. But the more important lesson is how the emu conflict was ultimately resolved. After the military withdrew, fences were built to separate the emus from farmland.
In other words, containment worked where military action failed. This was the approach that previous U.S. administrations had adopted with Iran, and while its efficacy may be debated, it certainly appeared to be working better than the current situation. Trump’s war has achieved none of the various stated aims. Iran’s nuclear programme is not being monitored and may be advancing, and it retains ballistic missile capabilities. While many of its leaders were killed, the current government is probably more hardline and less willing to compromise. The Strait of Hormuz is now effectively closed, and Tehran is aware of its leverage over the shipping chokepoint. At this point, it’s hard to see how Trump can get a better deal than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the U.S., European countries, China and Iran, from which he withdrew during his first term in 2018. It’s not too late for Trump to learn from the Emu War and recognise that military action might not deliver the desired result. The best way to deal with Iran may instead be to play a long game of containment, coupled with punishments and rewards according to behaviour.
(The views expressed here are those of the author, a columnist for Reuters.) Enjoying this column? Check out Reuters Open Interest (ROI), your essential new source for global financial commentary. ROI delivers thought-provoking, data-driven analysis of everything from swap rates to soybeans. Markets are moving faster than ever. ROI can help you keep up. Follow ROI on LinkedIn and X.
(Editing by Marguerita Choy)