By Andrew Mills
Sept 30 – A flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv transmitted emergency signals over Jordanian airspace on Wednesday morning, diverting to Saudi Arabia, initially raising fears of a potential hijacking. The Boeing 737 landed safely at Tabuk airport. What appears to have occurred is a physical altercation between the pilots in the cockpit, with one wielding a knife. Israel’s defence minister said preliminary information suggested an attempt to crash the plane. Passengers reported screaming and blood. It was an extraordinary incident on a route that has become well established since the UAE and Israel normalized ties — and another stark illustration of how raw and unpredictable the region has become.
Meanwhile, underneath the immediate crises, diplomacy continues. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi was in Doha on Tuesday night after rounds of shuttle talks in New York, to collect a US response to Tehran’s latest ceasefire proposal. The sides agree on what needs to happen, sources say. They disagree on the order.
This week’s Gulf Currents explores what might come next: whether Gulf states are genuinely repositioning their security architecture away from reliance on the United States, or simply scrambling to adapt to a rapidly changing regional landscape.
NEWS BRIEFING
QatarEnergy has extended force majeure notices on LNG deliveries to Italian utility Edison and Asian customers. Edison won’t receive cargoes until at least December, while Asian clients including Bangladesh and Pakistan have been notified of extensions until November. Qatar is among the conflict’s biggest economic casualties, with LNG exports slashed by 96%. It exported just 18 cargoes until the end of August, down from 509 last year.
Saudi Arabia has resumed oil tanker loadings from its Red Sea port of Yanbu following the restart of the East-West Pipeline, which was damaged by drone attacks on September 11. Current throughput stands at approximately 2 to 2.65 million barrels per day, expected to climb to 3 to 4 million bpd soon, though a full recovery to pre-attack levels of 5.5 million bpd may take another month.
Singapore’s state investor Temasek, with a $405.5 billion portfolio, plans to open offices in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in the first half of 2027, expanding to 15 offices across 11 countries. The move signals the fund’s confidence in the Gulf’s long-term growth prospects and economic transformation, despite ongoing regional tensions affecting markets and shipping.
GULF SEARCHING FOR SECURITY BEYOND WASHINGTON
For the first time in nearly 10 months, a top Emirati official, Vice President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed, accepted a Saudi invitation and flew to Riyadh on Tuesday. There, he met with two of the kingdom’s most powerful men: Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
This was not a routine meeting of Gulf officials discussing fraternal ties. It marked the first break in the deep freeze that settled over the UAE-Saudi relationship after their December rupture. But it may signal something far larger: a broader reckoning across the Gulf about security arrangements that no longer center on American guarantees.
For seven months, the Gulf has borne the brunt of a war it actively opposed. The US and Israel launched their conflict with Iran regardless of that opposition. Saudi Arabia has recently faced Houthi attacks on its cities and economic lifelines; the US has notably resisted meaningful assistance. Now, as the US forces exit Iraq, the message to Gulf capitals grows clearer still: American security commitments are contracting, not expanding.
Is the US regional security umbrella closing?
The consequences of the conflict are rippling across the region. At last week’s meeting between Gulf leaders and US President Donald Trump, Qatar proposed a framework for a regional security architecture that would include both Iran and the Arab Gulf states — an extraordinary shift in thinking. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani framed it starkly: “Lasting security cannot be built through repeated cycles of escalations and retaliation, or arrangements that leave any state permanently exposed to insecurity.”
When Gulf states begin questioning decades of American security partnership, old regional rivalries become negotiable. If the UAE and Saudi Arabia are talking again, it may be because both are searching for new architectures of regional stability.
The official readouts from Sheikh Mansour’s visit speak only of “fraternal relations” and “mutual interest” — language too generic to reveal what was actually discussed. But a broader pattern is emerging: the Gulf states are no longer content to wait for American security guarantees that might not materialize.
What emerges next will be telling. Is the UAE-Saudi rapprochement the centerpiece of a genuine regional realignment — a new security order built on Gulf-Turkey-Pakistan cooperation, selective European engagement and possible overtures to Beijing? Or are these initiatives simply overlapping attempts by desperate states to fill a vacuum, with little coordination or clear vision?
The security pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan — known as the Mecca Accord — so far remains more concept than reality. Qatar’s Iran-inclusive security framework has barely begun to take shape. European military support, while real, is episodic rather than institutionalized. China’s silence is notable but reveals nothing about its willingness to commit.
Are the Gulf Arab states moving toward something coherent, or simply away from something broken?
(Editing by Aidan Lewis)